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"Animal Liberation: A Affair"�Triangular  
Environmental Ethics 4 (1980), pp. 311-38� 
In "Animal Liberation: A Triangu­
lar Affair," J. Baird Callicott delivers 
what can fairly be labelled the "clas­
sic" environmental ethics critique of 
the animal l'ights movement. Callicott 
claims that the impression of unity 
deriving -from the opposition to 
humanist ethics which animal liberation 
and environmental ethics share may be 
"rather superficial and conceal sub­
strata of thought and value which are 
not at all similar."[315] He goes on 
to concl ude that 
humane moralism has located 
moral value in individuals, 
[centering] its attention on the 
competing criteria for moral 
standi ng and r'ig hts holdi ng, 
while environmental ethics 
locates ultimate value in the 
"biotic community" and assigns 
differential mora I va Iue to the 
constitutive individuals rela­
tively to that standard. 
Allied to this difference ar'e 
many others. One of the more 
conspicuous is that in envi ron­
mental ethics, plants are 
included within the parameters 
of the ethical theory as well as 
animals. Indeed, inanimate 
entities such as oceans and 
lakes, mountains, forests, and 
wetlands are assigned a 
greater value than individual 
animals. . There are in­
tractable practical differences 
between environmental ethics 
and the animal liberation move­
ment. The animal liberation/ 
animal rights movement is in 
the final analysis utterly unp­
racticable. The land ethic, by 
contrast, is eminently practica­
ble. [337 -8] . 
Thus, Callicott sees animal 
liberation and environmental ethics 
differing over holism vs. individual­
ism, extending "direct ethical consid­
erability" [312] to non-sentient enti­
ties, and certain practical matters, 
such as the morality of hunting, and 
he believes that, because of these 
differences, environmental ethics is at 
least closer to providing an acceptable 
ethic than is animal liber'ation. He 
also considers the holism vs. individ­
ualism issue to be "perhaps the most 
fundamental theoretical difference 
between environmental ethics and the 
ethics of animal liberation." [337] This 
review will be confined to a critical 
discussion of Callicott's "environmental 
holism" and the criticism of animal lib­
eration as "life-loathing" and "world­
denying" [333] which he derives from 
it. 
II 
Callicott claims that "ecology has 
made it possible to apprehend the 
landscape as an articulate unity" and 
that "land is integrated as a human 
community is integrated. "[321-2] The 
moral significance 
discovery is that 
the good of the 
whole serves as 
the assessment 
of this ecological 
community as a 
a standard for 
of the relative 
value and relative ordering of 
its con stitutive pa rts and 
therefore provides a means of 
adjudicating the often mutually 
contradictory demands of the 
pa rts con sidered sepa rately for 
equal consideration. [324-5] 
He goes on to claim that Plato pro­
poses a similar holistic view in his 
Republic, [327-9] and, ostensively 
defi n i ng "envi ronmental eth ics" by 
reference to Aldo Leopold's "land 
ethic,"[311] he identifies its basic 
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principle as Leopold's claim that 
A thing is right when it tends 
to preserve the integrity, sta­
bility, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when 
it tends otherwise. [320] 
Finally, Callicott concludes that by 
adopting this environmental holism, 
we human bei ngs cou Id reaffit~m
our pa rt ic ipat ion innatu re by 
accepting life as it is given 
without a sugar coating. 
Instead of imposing artificial 
legalities, rights, and so on on 
natu re, we mig ht ta ke the 
opposite cou rse and accept and 
affirm natural biological laws, 
principles, and limitations in 
the human personal and social 
spheres. Such appears 'to 
have been the postu re towa I'd 
life of tribal peoples in the 
past. [334] 
This reaffirmation he takes to be the 
opposite of the "world-denying," 
"life-loathing" philosophy of the animal 
I ibe ration movement. 
This account of environmental 
holism and its supposed moral conse­
quences raises numerous questions, of 
which I shall consider the following 
th ree: 
(i) � Is as Callicott portrays	 holism, 
it, an acceptable moral position? 
(ii) � Is Leopold's principle an accep­
table moral pri nciple? 
(iii) � Is liberation a "Iife­	 animal 
loathing" morality? 
Both mainstream moral philosophies 
and everyday Western morality have 
long had a hoi istic d imen sion to them. 
Moral philosophers as different as 
Hobbes, Jefferson, Kant, and Mill 
agree that 
a part of an individual's value lies� 
in his/her role in a community,� 
the good of the community can� 
(morally) sometimes be cited in 
E&A V/4 
adjudicating conflicts, and 
individuals can (morally) sometimes 
be called on to ma ke sacl~ifices
for theil~ community. 
Let us call any moral philosophy or' 
everyday morality which incot"porates 
these three principles "partially holis­
tic." Judaism and contemporary Eng­
lish socialism are examples of cUt~rent,
common moralities which are pat~tially
holistic. ' 
The animal libel~ation ethics pro­
posed by such writers as Peter Singer. 
and Bernard Rollin are also partially 
holistic. 1 The strong' utilitat~ian
strain in the animal liberation move­
ment wh ich has developed over the 
past fifteen years entails taking such 
a partial holistic view, and some ani­
mal rights philosophers, such as Tom 
Regan, have even cl~iticized such util­
ita ria n animal liberation ists as Si nger 
for going too far in this holistic 
di rection. 2 Consequently, it mis­
I~epresents animal liberation to locate 
it on one side of a simpl istic individ u·· 
alism vs. holism dichotomy. 
Howeve 1', it does not mi s I~ep resent 
animal liberation, or' mainstream moral 
philosophy and practice, to oppose 
them to what Callicott is proposing. 
The possible extreme which disturbs 
Regan about utilitarian versions of 
animal liberation is, apparently, just 
the extreme that Callicott is advocat­
ing, for he would have us believe that 
an individual's moral value should be 
totally determined by his/her role in a 
community. Callicott says things. like 
the following in discussing (his ver­
sion of) envi ronmental holism: 
The land ethic is holistic in 
the sense that the integr'ity, 
stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community is its summum 
bonum. , .. The good of the 
biotic community is the ultimate 
measure of the moral value, 
the rightness or wrongness, of 
actions. In every case 
the effect upon ecological 
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systems is the decisive factor 
in the determination of the 
ethical quality of actions .... 
Modern ethical theory has con­
sistently located mOt~al value in 
individuals, and humane moral­
ism t~emains fil~mly within this 
modern convention, while envi­
ronmental eth ics locates u Iti­
mate value in the Itbiotic com­
munity" and assigns dif­
ferential moral value to the 
constitutive individuals rela­
tively to this standard. [311, 
320, 337] 
While such statements do not explicitly 
state that individuals have moral value 
only through their contributions to a 
community (specifically, the so-called 
"biotic community"), they do strongly 
suggest that that is what Callicott 
understa nds by "hoi ism. " 
It is this view of the moral role to 
be played by holism which I shall be 
referring to as "total holism" and be 
discussing here. Anything less than 
this total view would not represent 
the "fundamental theol"etical" break 
with standard moral philosophy and 
practice that Callicott sees in (his 
version of) envi ronmental hoi ism, 
since standard moral philosophy and 
practice are partially holistic. Conse­
quently, it seems not only more inter­
esting but also fair to inter~pret Calli­
cott's holism as total holism. 3 Now, 
has Callicott provided us with good 
reasons to move from partial to total 
holism? 
The "body of empirical experience 
and theory which is summed up in the 
term ecology," and which Callicott 
identifies as "the ph i losoph ica I context 
of the land ethic and its conceptual 
foundation" [321] cannot (logically) 
entail that we ought (morally) to take 
such a step. If all forms of life Or) 
earth, including the· human form, in 
some sense "depend on" each other 
for their survival, it could follow that 
our role in the biotic "community" is 
our "ultimate" significance, in the 
ironic way that, as Camus says in The 
Myth of Sisyphus, suicide is the 
"fundamental" philosophical question. 
That is, it cou Id be that unless we 
pay attention to the biotic significance 
of our actions, we will not be around 
to appreciate aesthetic, moral, or 
other values. However, that these 
,values would cease to exist if we 
destroy the balance of nature does not 
entail, or even suggest, that our 
moral value is limited to or in any 
other than this it~onic sense "derives 
from" the value we have for maintain­
ing that balance. 
Similarly, Plato's moral philosophy 
does not propose or even suggest 
total holism. The guiding concern of 
Socl~atesI thoug ht experiment in the 
Republic is not "the integrity, stabil­
ity, and beauty" of the state. 
Rather, that guiding concern is what 
will produce the best life for human 
beings: 
Socr'ates: My notion is that a 
state - comes into ex istence 
because no individual is self­
sufficient; we all have many 
needs. . Having all these 
needs, we call in one another's 
help to satisfy our various 
requirements; and when we 
have collected a number of 
helpers and associates to live 
together in one place, we call 
th at settlement a state. 4 
Thus, the individual members of Pla­
to's ideal state are valued not only as 
contributors to the state but also as 
the ends for which the state exists. 
Furthermore, Callicott claims that 
"from the vantage point of ecological 
biology, pain and pleasure seem to 
have noth i ng at aII to do with good 
and evil." [332] Plato, on the other 
hand, is a paradigm eudaemonist, 
arguing that the value of justice, both 
inthe statea ndin the i nd iv id uaI, lies 
in the "true," enduring happiness is 
provides. s Thus, the ultimate goal of 
Plato's moral philosophy is found not 
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in the structure and maintenance of a 
community but in the quality of life of 
individuals, the structuring and main­
tenance of the community being 
ordered to that end. Consequently, 
Callicott's total holism cannot find 
respectability through association with 
Plato's Republic. 
As noted above, another reason 
Callicott gives for valuing total holism 
is that it provides a way of adjudicat­
in g conf Iicts of interests. Howeve I' , 
as a logical claim, that much can be 
said for all moral principles, e.g., the 
principle of utility, the categorical 
imperative, the ethical teachings of 
the Bible, the principles of fairness 
elabol'ated by Johnjo  Rawls in A Theory 
of Justice, and so forth. Th is is 
because one of the functions of moral 
principles is to provide guidance in 
I'esolvingt  conflicts of interests. Con­
sequently, there is nothing logically 
unique about total holism here. 
As a practical claim, it is, to say 
the least, not obvious, nor has it 
been shown, that total holism would 
bea more practicable guide for adju­
dicating conflicts of interests than 
contemporary morality is or than other 
ethical theories would be. Any theory 
which, like total holism, advocates a 
single goal for action will be tidy. 
However, total holism is not the only 
moral theory which rests on only one 
ultimate pt~inciple. andI Utilitarianism 
Kantianism are similarly single-minded 
moral theories . Consequently, total 
holism does not have a practical 
advantage on this score. We may also 
note that single-principled moral theo­
ries have repeatedly proven unaccep­
table, and everyday morality does not 
follow any such simplifying philoso­
phy. It seems unlikely that a princi­
ple which proposes making the sum­
mum bonum something which is 
indifferent to i nd ivid ua I well-bei ng wi II 
be able to reverse that trend. 
Therefore, the. simplicity Callicott 
seems to admire in total holism may 
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actually be more of a vice than a vir­
tue. Thus, on both logical and prac­
tical grounds, total holism's suggested 
ability to adjudicate conflicts of intet~­
ests does not indicate that it is pref­
erable to partial holism. 
Finally, there is no moral reason 
for adopting total holism. The com­
mon, moral goal of reducing the suf­
fering in life and otherwise making 
life more enjoyable and fulfilling would 
not obviously be more effectively pu roo: 
sued by valuing individuals only as 
contributors to a community . Indeed, 
since it is individuals, not communi­
ties, which experience enjoyment, ful­
fi Ilment, distress, and frustration and 
since total holism proposes regarding 
individuals as disposable items in the 
pursuit of the integt~ity, stability, and 
beauty of the community, it seems 
reasonable to concl ude that total 
holism would not provide as likely a 
path to th is moral goal as ou I' cu I~­
rent, mixed morality, which dit~ectlyl
values individuals and their quality of 
life. Certainly, considerable argument 
would have to be provided to warrant 
believing otherwise. Similarly, thel~e
is no reason to believe that total 
holism would provide a better way of 
developing moral character. Certain 
traditional moral virtues, such as 
compassion, tolerance, love and other 
emotional attachments to specific indi­
viduals, individual initiative, and 
self-respect, could actually be dis­
cou raged by va rious forms of total 
hoi ism, inc Iud i ng CaII icott' s . FinaII y , 
total holism need not contribute to 
insuring fairness. Insofar as a wil­
derness area in which "one being lives 
at the expense of others" [333] is an 
example of a total holistic order~,
insuring fairness seems irrelevant to 
total holism. 
Thus, it seems fair to conclude 
that total holism is not obviously a 
superior or even an acceptable mor'al 
outlook and that it would take consid­
erable argument to demonstrate that it 
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is-if such at'guments could be found. 
Callicott does not provide that argu­
ment, and nothing he says suggests 
how such arguments could be devel­
oped. (I have not fOLi nd that other 
envit~onmental holists pt~ovide compel­
ling Ot' cohet'ent arguments for total 
h0 Ii sm, e ithe t' . ) 
ii 
Turn to Leopold's claim that 
whether something is right or wrong 
is determined by whether or not it 
contributes to the integrity, stability, 
and beauty of the biotic "community." 
Is this an acceptable moral principle? 
Once again, there are both practical 
and logical questions here. This 
time, we shall consider the practical 
issues first. 
Callicott is clearly opposed to the 
utilitarian elements in contemporary 
morality, which he identifies as "a 
prophylactic ethic of maximizing 
rewards (pleasure) and minimizing 
unwelcome information (pain)," [323] 6 
and ,he sees Leopold's principle as 
pointing us toward a more strenuous 
way of life. He seems to reg ret that 
"it is impossible today to return to 
the symbiotic relationship of Stone 
Age man to the natu t~al envi ronment" 
and to favor all of the following: 
simple diet and vigorous exercise, a 
renaissance of tribal cultural experi­
ence, cu Itivating a tolerance for pai n, 
optimizing population by sexual conti­
nency, abortion, infanticide, and 
stylized warfare, regarding sickness 
as.a worse evil than death, eating 
only what one can hunt, gather, or 
g."OW for oneself or barter ft'om one's 
neighbo.·s and friends, and leaving 
people who at·e injured in wilderness 
areas to get out on their own or "die 
in the attempt." [327, 334, 336,338] 
There are the "practical" conse­
quences of the ethic Callicott 
describes as "eminently practicable." 
As these consequences indicate, 
(Callicott's interpretation of) Leopold's 
principle is fundamentally out of touch 
with contempora ry mora Iity , wh ich 
emphasizes compassion for the injured, 
the sick, and the handicapped, toler­
ance for diverse ways of life, concern 
to expand the diversity of opportuni­
ties and experiences available to peo­
ple, protecting the weak against the 
strong, and hope for progress. Cal­
licott doubtless regards this being out 
of touch as a ma rk of the hoi istic 
environmentalists' willingness "to 
undertake creative ethical reflection, 
exploration, [and] reexamination of 
historical eth ical theory." [319] How­
ever, since "mot·ality" is a common 
concept, rather than a technical term 
which experts can stipulatively define, 
its meaning is established through our 
common, mot~al practice. Conse­
q uently, to the extent that a proposed 
"ethic," meaning merely "a code for 
conducting one's life," is fundamen-. 
tally out of touch with our common 
moral practice, to that extent it is 
questionable whether that proposed 
code is a morality at all. 
Significant moral criticism of com­
mon, moral pt~actice cannot (logically) 
be based solely on the findings of a 
science, such as ecology, remote from 
the history and practice of morality. 
Significant moral criticism must (logic­
ally) be based, at least in part, on 
currently accepted moral principles or 
values. Even Immanuel Kant, perhaps 
the most abstract of moral ph i1oso­
phers, acknowledges this, beginning 
his Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals with a section on the "Common 
Rational Knowledge of Morals" and 
confirming his ultimate moral principle 
by showing that it yields the same 
answers as everyday morality in four 
clear cases. Similarly, animal libera­
tionists commonly call for the libera­
tion of animal s as the next step, 
beyond combatting racism and sexism, 
in extending our common, egalitarian 
moral principles to all those who suf­
fer by not bei ng covered by them. 
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This requirement that significant moral 
criticism keep in touch with moral his­
tory and practice is, presumably, why 
Callicott attempts to draw an analogy 
between his environmental holism and 
Plato's moral philosophy. However, 
that analogy fails. This leaves it 
highly doubtful that environmental 
holism provides a basis for moralcrit­
icism of moral practice or moral phi­
losoph ies, such as an imal liberation, 
and equally doubtful whether environ­
mental holism is, itself, a moral phi­
losophy at all. 
The terms of Leopold's principle 
reinforce this' doubt. Leopold men­
tions three specific values in his 
principle: integrity, stability, and 
beauty. The last of these is, 
directly, an aesthetic value. It can 
take on moral significance only by 
being tied to some moral value, e. g., 
through the principle that "Goodness, 
truth, and beauty are one and the 
same" or the argument that "Beauty is 
something people enjoy; so, since the 
principle of utility instructs us to 
maximize happiness, we ought (mor­
ally) to consider the aesthetic conse­
quences of our actions when determin­
ing Whatw  we ought (morally) to do." 
Leopold and Callicott have not pro­
vided principles or arguments to 
establish ·the moral significance of the 
beauty of the biotic community. Since 
Leopold's principle is supposed to be 
the fundamental principle of the land 
ethic, stating its summum bonum and 
ultimate measure of moral value, the' 
logic of this total, environmental 
holism would seem to preclude such a 
principle or argument. Consequently, 
it is, at least, highly doubtful that 
the beauty of the biotic community can 
have moral significance here. 7 
The first of Leopold's value terms, 
"integrity," can refer to a moral 
value, but the term does not here 
have its moral meaning. It does not 
mean "probity," "rectitude," or "firm 
adherence to a code of values." Talk 
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of "the probity of the biotic commu­
nity" would be nonsense. Rather, 
"integrity" her'e means "unity" and 
"completeness," referring to the con­
dition of not having been dismembered 
or otherwise reduced to a truncated 
version of its fully functional form. 
Thus, "integrity" here denotes bioJo­
gical or ecological conditions. Once 
again, some principle or argument 
tying these conditions to moral values 
is needed to give them moral signifi­
cance, and, once again, neither Leo­
pold nor Callicott pt'ovides, nOI~ likely 
could provide, such a pt~inciple or 
argument. 
Finally, the second of Leopold's 
three value terms, "stability," also 
refers to a physical condition-and it 
definitely is startling to see this con­
dition offered as an ultimate value for 
a "biologically enlightened" value 
theory in a post-Darwinian era. Once 
again, we are given no reason to 
believe that the stability of the cur­
rent state of nature has moral signifi­
cance. 
Thus, there is nothing in Leopold's 
principle which identifies it as a moral 
principle. Labelling something an 
"ethic," in the sense· of being a code 
for conducting oneself, such as "the 
hunting ethic," does not establish that 
it is a code of moral values or even 
that it has moral significance. The 
moral value of hunting remains an 
open question, even though hunting 
has long had an "ethic. "8 Considet~a­
ble argument is needed to show that a 
principle referring to an aesthetic 
value and ecological conditions has 
moral value, let alone expresses an 
acceptable, ultimate moral pl"'inciple. 
Until such argument is provided, if it 
can be provided, the so-called "land 
ethic" would less misleadingly be 
renamed "the land aesthetic" or "the 
ecologist's code." 
Beyond his mistaken analogy to 
Plato's Republic, the only suggestion 
 119 E&A V/4 
Callicott offer's for why we should 
r'egar'd (his inter'pretation of) Leo­
pold's envi r'onmental pt'inciple as a 
moral principle is that 
the rept'esentationr  of the natu­
ra' environment as, in Leo­
pold's terms "one humming 
community" brings into play, 
whether rationally or not, 
those stirrings of conscience 
which we feel in relation to 
delicately complex, functioning 
social and organic sys­
tems. [322] 
However, this suggestion begs the 
question, for it is fa r fr'om obvious, 
that the envi ronment can properly be 
described as a "community" in a mor­
ally significant sense. Ecologically, 
"community" means merely "a group of 
plants and animals living in a specific 
region under relatively similar condi­
tions" or "the region in which they 
, live. " [American Heritage Dictionary] 
Ther'e is nothing here of the feeling 
of community, including being cooper­
ative, mutual care and respect, shar­
ing of burdens and responsibilities, 
emotional and moral attachments, 
intentionally formed alliances, a sense 
of obligations to, responsibilities for, 
or' rights against other members of the 
group, and identifying with, feeling 
one can rely on, and feeling one is 
making a contribution to the group-all 
of which contribute to ma ki ng commu­
nities morally significant. Lacking all 
of these dimensions, a merely ecologi­
cal "community" lacks moral signifi­
cance. That plants and animals, 
including ourselves, need each other 
and other inorganic things, such as 
unpolluted water and air, in order to 
survive does not make us a "commu­
nity" in a morally significant sense, 
and to try to stir moral feelings by 
employing that term in discussing eco­
logical issues is to equivocate and to 
substitute rhetoric for argument. 
Until further argument is supplied 
to show, if it can be shown, that 
Leopold's principle is a moral 
principle, it seems fair to regard his 
land "ethic" as the statement of the 
way of life he personally preferred, 
rather than as a mor'al principle. 
Some people like cities and luxury; 
others prefer the countr'y and auster­
ity-in terms of the substance of Leo­
pold's principle, the significance of 
the'land "ethic" is that it provides a 
guide fot, the latter group. 
Finally, Leopold's pr'inciple could 
be given moral significance, if it pro­
vided useful guidance for accomplish­
ing ou r common, moral goals. How­
ev er , it i s doubtfu I t hat it can p Iay 
that role. As already indicated, . it 
would not, at least as interpreted by 
Callicott, encou rage the development 
of some morally highly. pt'ized charac­
ter traits, such as compassion. Also,. 
it would not help to insure fairness, 
since it would, apparently, counsel 
against defending the weak against 
the strong. Finally, in directing us 
to cultivate a tolerance for pain, to 
leave injured people to die, to destroy 
animals in order to save plants, and 
so forth, it seems unlikely that it 
would provide us much guidance in 
reducing suffering and otherwise mak­
ing life more enjoyable and fulfilling. 
Consequently, Leopold's principle is 
not likely to be of service in attaining 
our common, moral goals. 
It seems fair to conclude that for 
all the above reasons, Leopold's prin­
ciple is not an acceptable moral prin­
ciple. (This is not to say, of course, 
that ecology cannot provide important 
information for making enlightened 
moral decisions.) 
iii 
Finally, let us briefly turn to Cal­
licott's charge that animal liberation is 
world-denying and life-loathing. Mor­
ality involves inhibiting and redirect­
ing native desires and tendencies, and 
in its fully developed form, it also 
involves projecting "better worlds" for 
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us to work towar·d. It follows that 
concerns, values, pr"inciples, codes, 
guides for action, etc., cannot be 
restricted to merely "accepting life -as 
it is given" and "accepting and 
affirming natural biological laws, prin­
ciples, and limitations," if they are to 
constitute a mor"ality. Consequently, 
taken at face value, Callicott's sup­
posedly "life-affirming," "world-ac­
cepting" environmental holism cannot 
(logically) be a moral ity. 
Such advice can take on moral sig­
nificance only if it is understood as 
encouraging us to do something which 
is not currently being done and which 
would make for~ a better world. Since 
Callicott proposes the land "ethic" as 
an alternative not only to animal lib­
eration but also to contempora ry, civ­
ilized life, he, apparently, does 
understand it in this way. However, 
when so understood, the ph rase "I ife 
as it is given" cannot (logically) refer" 
to life as it actually is being led by 
us. Thus, Callicott is not really pro­
posing that we "accept life as it is 
given." Rather, behind that mislead­
ing rhetoric, he is rejecting life as it 
currently is and advocating that we 
follow a way of life as he wou Id like it 
to be. Furthermore, suggesting that, 
as far as possible, we foresake tens 
of thousands of years of evolution and 
history and return to the way of life 
of Stone Age tribes marks Callicott's 
"ethic" as a particularly "world-deny­
ing" vision. Consequently, when 
interpreted in the way which makes it 
logically possible for Callicott's "ethic" 
to be a morality, it is neither life-af­
fi rming nor world-accepting. 
On the other hand, refusing to 
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accept and affirm avoidablesuffer'ing, 
unfair distributions of goods, uninhi­
bited aggression, and so forth, are 
refusals which have long been and 
conti nue to be pa rt of everyday mor­
ality. As such, they are a well-es­
tablished part of life as it is. Animal 
liberation extends such concerns, 
which have traditionally been focused 
on the human world and on human 
life, to include equal consideration for 
animals. I n this way, animal libera­
tion is simply carr~yin-g on the busi­
nes's of everyday moral practice. 
Therefor"e, it does not loathe or deny 
life as it is. Rather, unlike Calli­
cott's proposed retreat to the wilder­
ness, animal liberation is participating 
in life and, hopefully, .in its continu­
ing moral evolution. 
III 
Thus, Callicott's total, envir"onmen­
tal holism and his criticism of animal 
liberation have little, if anything, to 
recommend them as moral theory and 
criticism. First, Callicott has not 
provided any reason for believing that 
holism should be more than a par"t of 
mor"ality. Second, the specific holistic 
principle Callicott advances, namely, 
Leopold's so-called "land ethic," has 
not been shown to be a moral pr"inci­
pie at all nor to be of particular~ use 
in attai n ing ou r common, moral goals. 
Finally, Callicott's criticisms of animal 
Iiberation are i ncoherent ~ Conse­
quently, total holistic, envi ronmental 
"ethicists" will have to mar'shall a 
great deal more argument, if that can 
be done, in order to show that their 
principles and criticisms are morally 
sig n ifica nt. 
Steve F. Sapontzis 
California State University, Hayward 
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Notes 
1.  Peter Singer, Animal Liberation is broken." He simply passes 
(New Yor~k: Avon Books, 1975), over the fact that in addition to 
Chapter 1, and Bernard Rollin, delivering unwelcome information, 
Animal Rights and Human Moraiity pain hurts. 
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 
1981), Part I. 7. While this is clearly a criticism of 
Callicott's conception of environ­-
2.   See Regan's "Utilitarianism, Veg­- menta I eth ics, it is not enti rely 
eta ria n is Ii1 , and AnimaI Rig ht s, " clear that it is an objection to 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 9 Leopold's position. Th is is 
(1980), pp. 305-24. because it is not clear that he 
regarded his principle' as just an 
3.   Evelyn Pluhar also interprets ethical principle. He introduces 
Callicott's position in this way, in that principle in A Sand County 
"Two Conceptions of an Environ­- Almanac (Oxford: Oxford Univer­-
mental Ethic and Their Implica­- sity Press, 1949) with the follow­-
tions, " Ethics & Animals IV ing remarks: 
. (1983) , p p . 120-3 , and Ernest Quit thinking about decent 
Partridge, another noted environ­- land-use as solely an eco­-
mental ethicist, at least does not nomic problem. Examine 
object to this interpretation of each question in terms of 
Callicott's position, in "Three what is ethically and esthet­-
Wr~ong Leads in a Search for an ically right, as well as what 
Environmental Ethic: Tom Regan is economically expedient. 
on Animal Rights, Inherent Val­- [224, emphasis added] 
ues, and 'Deep Ecology, "' Ethics & Consequently, it may be that Leo­-
. Animals V (1984), page 73, note pold intended "beauty" to have 
18.  only aesthetic significance in his 
principle. Callicott, however, 
4.� Republic, II, 368-9 (Cornford does even suggest spl itti ng not 
translation) . Leopold's principle into aesthetic 
and (supposedly) ethical compo­-
5. Ibid., IV, 576-592.   nents. 
6.� Callicott treats pain as if it were 8.�   Robert W. Loftin makes this point 
merely an organic monitoring sys­- in "The Morality of Hunting," 
tem putting messages on a mental Environmental Ethics 6 (1984), pp. 
display screen, e.g., "Your ankle 241-50. 
